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uébec trade unions can boast about a unionization rate of 39.7%, 
which is the highest in Canada (average 31.2%) and much higher 
than the mean American rate.  Nevertheless, this enviable situation 
at best has stabilized, and for the worst has started to decline, if decimals are to 
be taken up seriously.  But let us consider the actual situation and its more recent 
developments in the legal framework and institutional arrangements.  As those 
are the result of social relations, in which the strength of trade unions, as well as 
their audience and legitimacy play a significant role, it is very difficult, and 
clearly out of the scope of this article, to screen all of the favourable factors that 
contributed to Quebec’s positive labour relations situation.  One key factor 
which, to trade union eyes, remains problematic, is the declining rate in the 
private sector (26.2%), as the traditionally unionised manufacturing jobs 
disappear and trade unions hardly make up with successes in the private tertiary 
sector.   
In this article, we will put forward the three factors that, as far as the 
unions are concerned, may not have been decisive but were surely important in 
this relative success in unionization.  We intentionally focus on subjects that are 
at discussion in the U.S. Employee Free Choice Act.  And, not surprisingly, these 
are the same matters which Québec trade unions have asked for or are fighting to 
keep, considering their instrumental role to the process of unionization. First is 
the basis on which union recognition is obtained – i.e. a ballot or majority union 
card sign-up.  Second is the scheme of arbitration of the first union contract. And 
lastly stands the creation of a Commission des relations du travail (CRT) in 2001 
(operational in 2003), an administrative body of a new type, with an 
encompassing mandate covering all the juridical apparatus related to work but 
also dedicated to the acceleration of procedures related to requests of union 
accreditation. 
       
THE SECRET BALLOT 
 
In Québec, union recognition based on card signing has been in place 
since the 1944 Loi sur les relations ouvrières (Labour Relations Act, which preceded 
the first Labour Code, or Code du travail, which was subsequently adopted in 
1964).  Although the law initially required that 60% of the employees signed 
cards for recognition to be granted, the threshold was quickly lowered to 50%.  A 
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union can still request recognition with less than 50% plus one of the cards 
signed (35% to 50%).  In this case a ballot is then organized to check if the 
majority of workers agree to be represented by the union.  It has always been 
very rare that a union would request recognition with less than a majority of the 
cards signed, as the odds of success are quite slim.  A ballot can also be organised 
if an employer can argue about union misdemeanours or convincingly express a 
doubt on the claim of an existing majority, such a situation being a reflection of 
the openness of the system to employer’s contests.  
 We could almost say that the “automatic” secret ballot is a non-subject in 
Québec (and even in the industrial relations textbooks).  Trade unions certainly 
do not favour this procedure even though it is accessible.  But employers’ 
organizations have been lobbying in favour of it on a regular basis, and 
individual employers (e.g. Wal-Mart) use all the opportunities to argue that 
Quebec’s mode of unionisation is not “democratic” because no ballot is held.  So 
the labour movement regularly stands up for the status quo, as a preventive mean 
of defence.  The argument is not original, but Québec trade unionists have 
experienced both with-and-without ballot procedures of accreditation – and on 
the basis of experience they prefer the existing system. 
 Indeed, Québec unions have seen how, when a vote is organized, 
employers use the period leading to the ballot to resort to the worst union 
busting tactics.  Firing of union activists, compulsory anti-union meetings, 
sudden changes in the organization of work, and threats to close the shop should 
the union be allowed are among the most common manoeuvres used to 
discourage workers to cast their ballots in favour of the union.  Of course, most 
of these practices are illegal, but proving it in court is extremely difficult, most 
notably because the union is not yet in the workplace and thus has a restricted 
access to the information necessary to plead the cause, and also because the 
workers are, precisely, afraid of the consequences their involvement could have 
on their job.   
At the core of the labour movement argument is the idea that, in this 
context, voting does not equal democracy.  Contrary to the most elementary rules 
of modern democracy, these compulsory votes are neither free nor transparent.  
The parties involved – the union and the employer – do not have equal access to 
the “electors” – the workers – as the employer (and his representatives) remains 
the sole master in “his” company.  In the capitalist system, the corporation 
represents one of the last non-democratic spaces of society where, thanks to the 
sacrosanct “management right”, arbitrary decisions can be taken without even 
consulting the concerned individuals. Having a union in a workplace does not 
make it a democratic space, but it certainly diminishes the ground on which 
arbitrary decisions can be taken. Much more than a question of wages, 
facilitating the presence of unions in workplaces is acknowledging their 
democratizing function.  Recognizing a union on the base of card signing is 
therefore more, not less, democratic, than automatically requiring a vote. 
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THE ARBITRATION OF THE FIRST CONTRACT 
 
In Québec, it is possible to ask for the arbitration of a first collective 
agreement, if the initial negotiations seem to go nowhere.  When this disposition 
was adopted in 1977 (following the British Columbia experience), unions 
considered it as an important victory, something like the final touch in the 
process of trade union recognition.  Of course, companies where unions decide to 
use this procedure are precisely the ones in which the employers fought 
vigorously to avoid the union.  After all, trade unions prefer to negotiate, even 
harshly, rather than putting the fate of their first contract in the hands of an 
arbitrator.  Still, after having seen many new unions disappear following months 
of union busting and employer refusal to negotiate, the labour movement 
thought very positively of this new possibility, which also constituted an 
additional argument for convincing hesitant workers in an organizing campaign.  
The actual feelings may be a bit different nowadays in union circles. No 
union representative would support abolishing the first contract arbitration 
scheme, which can permit a new union to survive and go on to negotiate a 
second contract.  But the appreciation of their practice among unions today is 
more subtle, especially considering the hard experience of the recent first 
contract arbitration in a Wal-Mart store.  The role of an arbitrator in such 
circumstances is to define the “market of reference” and to rule on comparable 
compensation work conditions.  This can be quite a simple operation in 
substantially unionized and homogenous sectors (e.g. municipal employees), but 
it becomes very tricky in less unionized and heterogeneous sectors. Should one 
compare Wal-Mart to a grocery store, to a department store, or even a hardware 
store? So the road is opened to months of harsh and technically-loaded 
discussions, with management experts and academics called on by both sides.  
For sure, without this procedure of arbitration of the first contract, the only 
unionized Wal-Mart store in North America would probably have lost its union 
recognition.  Still the experience was painful for the workers involved, and 
painful and costly for the union. 
 
THE CREATION OF A NEW MECHANISM (CRT) 
 
The creation of a newly conceived Commission des relations de travail (2001) 
seems much more consensual. Important parts of the labour movement, namely 
the Québec Federation of Labour, had long asked for such a commission. An 
official enquiry commission on work (Commission consultative sur le travail), of 
which some prominent labour leaders were members, had made the creation of a 
new administrative structure a priority of its report in 1985. So the 2001 
legislative modifications were long over-due.  Before these changes, there were 
two levels of decision as far as requests for union recognition were concerned.  
The first level of decision (the Commissaires généraux du travail) could always be 
contested on one or another basis (design of the bargaining unit, number of 
cards, violation of the Labour Code, etc.) and appeals were then made to the 
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second level, the Tribunal du travail.  Employers unwilling to accept a union in 
their premises made extensive use of this procedure, resulting in long delays to 
certification or, even worse, the disappearance of the case altogether due to 
personnel movements and employers’ harassment. That is notably what 
happened to an important request concerning a MacDonald’s restaurant in 
Montréal earlier this decade. 
The new CRT is now the one and only level where union recognition can 
be granted, even if an employer contests the design of the bargaining unit.  The 
Commission has jurisdiction over all laws concerning labour relations and is 
autonomous from the Ministry of Labour.  Unions can now realistically expect a 
conclusive answer with only short delays.  The overall situation has improved 
notably due to the CRT and labour relations (at least concerning union 
recognition) have become less litigious.  Some industrial relations commentators 
even consider that the ordinary tribunals have now become redundant in work-
related conflicts. Nevertheless, a thoroughly anti-union employer can still 
develop ways to lengthen the recognition process, though it is less easy than 
before.  
 
IS THE SECRET IN THE LAW? 
  
 Although the Québec experience is encouraging for unions operating in 
other jurisdictions where the juridical apparatus is more hostile to labour, we 
think that the existing apparatus can still be improved.  We do not know of any 
Québec union organizer who finds that his job is easy, and this is especially true 
in the private service sector.  As stated by one academic and former union leader, 
Jean Gérin-Lajoie (2004), one could almost consider that if an industry is 
unionized at a 12% rate, then an attempt at unionization in a company of this 
particular industry has twelve chances in one hundred to succeed.  This is surely 
a pessimistic view, considering the very low rate of unionization in sectors where 
the workforce is more numerous.  But the obstacles to unionization remain 
daunting, even in Quebec. 
 Beyond legal considerations, there is a growing consciousness within the 
labour movement that efforts must be made to enhance the arguments for 
unionization.  If, in the manufacturing sector, the argument of significantly better 
wages was and is still relevant, this is not the case in other industries. Across the 
whole labour market, the greatest advantages to unionization are based in the 
limitation of the employer’s powers, the introduction of genuine equity, 
employment security, and more generally in the democratization of the 
workplace. 
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